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CASE NOTES 
ANTITRUST LAW-THE CLAYTON ACT-"ENGAGED IN COM- 
MERCE" REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 7-United States u. American 
Building Maintenance Industries, 422 U.S. 271 (1975). 
American Building Maintenance Industries (American), a 
nationwide corporation supplying ten percent of the janitorial 
services in southern California,l acquired the stock of both the J. 
E. Benton Management Corporation and the Benton Mainte- 
nance Company and merged the latter company into a wholly 
owned subsidiary of American. At the time, the two Benton com- 
panies (Benton) taken together were the fourth largest supplier 
of janitorial services in southern California, with approximately 
seven percent of the total sales. In the course of its operations, 
Benton performed janitorial and maintenance service for several 
customers who were engaged in interstate commerce. All of Ben- 
ton's contracts were performed within California, however, and 
almost all of its supplies were purchased from local distribut0rs.l 
Benton did not advertise nationally and made only limited use 
of interstate communication  system^.^ 
The United States brought a civil antitrust suit against 
American, alleging that the acquisition and merger of Benton 
might substantially lessen competition in the sale of janitorial 
services in southern California4 and thereby constitute a violation 
of section 7 of the Clayton Act.5 The district court granted Ameri- 
can's motion for summary judgment, holding that the Benton 
1. American was the largest supplier of janitorial services in southern California. In 
that area alone, American's janitorial service revenues for 1969 were $10.9 million. Brief 
for Appellant at 4, United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271 
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant]. 
2. Between January 1, 1969, and February 28, 1970, Benton's direct purchases in 
interstate commerce amounted to less than $140.00. 422 U.S. a t  274 n.4. 
3. Between January 1969 and June 1970, Benton mailed less than 200 letters across 
state lines. 422 U.S. at 274 n.3. Between January 1969 and June 1970, Benton paid Pacific 
Telephone and Telegraph $18,260.45 for telephone services. Only $19.78 represented 
charges for out-of-state calls related to business. Appendix at 213, United States v. Ameri- 
can Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Appendix]. 
4. The Government asserted in the complaint that the action of American may sub- 
stantially lessen competition for the following reasons: (1) Actual and potential competi- 
tion between American and Benton has been eliminated. (2) Benton has been eliminated 
as a substantial factor in competition. (3) American has increased in relative size to such 
a point that its advantage over its competitors threatens to be decisive. (4) Concentration 
in the sale of janitorial services has increased to the detriment of actual and potential 
competition. Appendix at 8. 
5. 15 U.S.C. 5 18 (1970). 
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companies were not engaged in commerce and that therefore the 
court lacked jurisdiction under section 7.' On direct appeal, the 
Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) that the "engaged in com- 
merce" requirement of section 7 means directly engaged in the 
flow of interstate commerce and is not satisfied by an intrastate 
corporation whose activities substantially affect interstate com- 
merce, and (2) that under the facts of the instant case, Benton 
was not engaged in the flow of interstate commerce. Three jus- 
tices dissented,' arguing that the "engaged in commerce" test 
should be held to extend to all corporations whose activities sub- 
stantially affect interstate commerce. 
The Clayton Act was one of several statutes8 enacted under 
the commerce clause of the Constitution9 to arrest the threat of 
increasing monopolization and concentrated control of industry. lo 
The jurisdictional test of each of these antitrust statutes is set 
forth in slightly different language, resulting in differing interpre- 
tations of the extent of the commerce power used by Congress in 
enacting each statute. 
A. The Sherman Antitrust Act 
The Sherman Act," enacted in 1890, was the first of the 
antitrust statutes; it prohibits all combinations in the form of 
trusts and conspiracies "in restraint of trade or commerce among 
the several States." In United States v.  E. C. Knight,12 the first 
decision of the Supreme Court interpreting the Sherman Act, the 
Court weakened the Act by concluding that manufacturing was 
not commerce and hence beyond the power of Congress to regu- 
6. The district court's decision is unreported. 
7. 422 U.S. a t  286 (dissent of Douglas & Brennan, JJ.). Id. at 287 (dissent of Black- 
mun, J.). 
8. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § §  1-3 (Supp. I, 1975), 15 U.S.C. §§  4-7 
(1970); Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. $ 8  8-11 (1970); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 
U.S.C. $§ 41-44,474, 51-58 (1970), 15 U.S.C.A. $ 8  45-46, 49-50 (Supp. I, 1975); Clayton 
Act, 15 U.S.C. $ 8  12-27,44 (1970); Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. 
$ 4  13, 13a-b, 21a (1970); Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13c (1970). 
9. "Congress shall have Power . . . to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
10. See, e.g., D. MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON Am 43-46 (1959) [hereinafter 
cited as MARTIN]. 
11. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. $0  1-3 (Supp. I, 1975), 15 U.S.C. §§  4-7 
(1970). 
12. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
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late.13 Signs of a revival began four years later,14 and in Standard 
Oil Co. v. United States15 the Court overruled the holding in 
Knight that manufacturing is beyond the reach of Congress.16 The 
Supreme Court has since expanded its interpretation of the com- 
merce provision of the Sherman Act pursuant to the notion that 
"Congress [in passing the Sherman Act] wanted to go to the 
utmost extent of its Constitutional power. . . ."I7 In Mandeville 
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., l8 for example, 
the Court held that the Sherman Act extends to intrastate trans- 
actions which substantially affect interstate commerce.lg In a few 
cases, the courts have denied Sherman Act jurisdiction over ac- 
tivities20 that Congress could possibly reach under the commerce 
clause. But i t  is generally assumed that the Sherman Act extends 
to the limit of congressional power under the commerce clause.21 
B. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 
Enacted at  the same time as the Clayton Act, section 5 of the 
13. Id. a t  16, 17 (In the E.C. Knight case, the Court reviewed American Sugar Refin- 
ing Company's acquisition of almost complete control of the manufacture of refined sugar 
within the United States.). 
14. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (A combina- 
tion of iron pipe manufacturers was held to restrain interstate commerce. Knight was 
distinguished as a combination in which the parties had not agreed about the future 
disposition of the manufactured products.). See also Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908); 
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). 
15. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
16. Id. a t  68, 69. The interpretation in Knight had "been so necessarily and expressly 
decided to be unsound as to cause the contentions to be plainly foreclosed and to require 
no express notice." Id. 
17. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944). 
Accord, United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945); United States 
v. Finis P. Ernest, Inc., 509 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975); Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 487 F.2d 
373 (9th Cir. 1973); Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 1077 (1972). But see Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustee of Rex Hosp., 511 F.2d 678 
(4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 33 (1975) (No. 74-1452); Evanston Cab Co. v. City 
of Chicago, 325 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964). 
For a discussion of different interpretations of the commerce provision of the Sherman 
Act see Kallis, Local Conduct and the Sherman Act, 1959 DUKE L.J. 236; Note, Portrait 
of the Sherman Act as a Commerce Clause Statute, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 323 (1974). 
18. 334 U.S. 219 (1948). 
19. Id. a t  232-35. 
20. See United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952) (medical 
practice); Riggall v. Washington County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. 
denied, 355 U.S. 954 (1958) (medical practice); Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex 
Hosp., 511 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 33 (1975) (No. 74-1452) 
(hospital health care services); Kallen v. Nexus Corp., 353 F. Supp. 33 (N.D. Ill. 1973) 
(bar review course); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947) (taxicab serv- 
ices); Evanston Cab Co. v. City of Chicago, 325 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 
V.S. 943 (1964) (taxicab services). 
21. See cases cited note 17 supm. 
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Federal Trade Commission prohibits "unfair methods of 
competition in commerce." In 1935, Congress considered amend- 
ing secton 5 to read "unfair methods of competition . . . in or 
affecting commerce"23 because the Federal Trade Commission 
had found "numerous unfair methods of competition and numer- 
ous deceptive acts and practices which, although done in intra- 
state commerce, seriously affect honest competitors engaged in 
interstate commerce."24 The bill died in the Senate.25 
The Supreme Court in FTC v. Bunte  Brothers, I ~ C . ~ ~  refused 
to judicially expand the commerce requirement of section 5 and 
held intrastate activities affecting interstate commerce beyond 
the reach of the legi~lation.~' Although Bunte  Brothers has never 
been judicially overruled, it has been eroded by broader interpre- 
tations of "in commerce."28 Recently, Congress overruled Bunte  
Brothers by replacing "in commerce" with "in or affecting com- 
merce" in sections 5, 6, and 12 of the Federal Trade Commission 
The express purpose of these amendments was to make the 
reach of this Act coextensive with congressional power under the 
commerce clause .30 
C. Section 2(a) of the  Robinson-Patman Act 
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act,31 an amendment 
22. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970). For a review of the legislative history of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act see G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ch. I (1924); 
Baker & Baum, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act: A Continuing Process of 
Redefinition, 7 VILL. L. REV. 517, 520-43 (1962). 
23. S. REP. NO. 46, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935). 
24. Id. a t  1. 
25. 80 CONG. REC. 2424 (1936). The bill apparently never was reconsidered. Earlier it 
had been argued that "Congress had gone as far as it had any lawful right to go when it 
undertook to regulate commerce and to deal with unfair practices in commerce." 79 CONG. 
REC. 1843 (1935) (remarks of Senator Austin). 
26. 312 U.S. 349 (1941) (Candy manufacturers in Illinois who used an "unfair method 
of competition" were outside the reach of section 5 because their sales, which affected 
interstate commerce, were wholly intrastate.). 
27. Id. at 355. 
28. See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. 
FTC, 366 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 932 (1967); Morton's Inc. v. FTC, 
286 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1961); Holland Furnance Co. v. FTC, 269 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1959), 
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 932 (1960). 
29. 15 U.S.C.A. $ 8  45,46(a)-(b), 52 (Supp. I, 1975), amending 15 U.S.C. $8 45,46(a)- 
(b), 52 (1970). 
30. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 29-31 (1974). 
31. 15 U.S.C. $ 13(a) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964). For a history of the 
enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act see E. KINTNER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER 6- 
16 (1970); F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 3-23, 559-620 
(1962) [hereinafter cited as ROWE]; Note, The  Commerce Requirement of the Robinson- 
Patman Act, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1255-58 (1971). 
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to the Clayton Act, prohibits persons "engaged in commerce, in 
the course of such commerce," from discriminating in price be- 
tween different purchasers "where either or any of the purchasers 
involved . . . are in commerce."32 As originally passed by the 
House, Congressman Patman's version also provided that  "[ilt 
shall also be unlawful for any person, whether in commerce or 
not, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between 
different  purchaser^."^^ This broader language was stricken be- 
fore final enactment because "the preceding language [the pres- 
ent section 2(a)] already covers all discriminations, both inter- 
state and intrastate, that lie within the limits of Federal author- 
 it^."^^ 
The "engaged in commerce" requirement of section 2(a) is of 
less importance than the same language in section 7 of the Clay- 
ton Act. In section 2(a) litigation, the focus has been on whether 
the transactions giving rise to an alleged discrimination are "in 
c ~ m m e r c e . " ~ ~  Obviously, if the sale is "in commerce," the seller 
is "engaged in commerce."36 The cases have therefore ignored the 
"engaged in commerce" requirement and turned on whether one 
of the transactions giving rise to the allegedly discriminatory sale 
"cross[ed] a state line."37 Recently, in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp 
Paving C~. ,~"he  Supreme Court discussed the jurisdictional 
reach of section 2(a). The Court reversed a broad interpretation 
given to the section by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals39 and 
- - 
32. The statute provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of 
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between 
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or 
any of the purchasers involved in such discrimination are in commerce . . . . 
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970). 
33. H.R. REP. NO. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1936). 
34. Id. 
It has been argued that congressional doubt about the constitutionality of the lan- 
guage of the bill after A.L.A. Schlechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 
(1935), led to the deletion of the language. Note, The Commerce Requirement of the 
Robinson-Patman Act, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1256 (1971). But see 86 HARV. L. REV. 765, 
769-72 (1973). 
35. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974); Food 
Basket, Inc. v. Albertson's, Inc., 383 F.2d 785, 787 (10th Cir. 1967); Willard Dairy Corp. 
v. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 309 F.2d 943, 946 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 934 
(1963). 
36. ROWE 78, 79. 
37. Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 483 F.2d 1140, 1144 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 414 U.S. 1116 (1973); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175, 178 (10th Cir. 19721, 
cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972); Hiram Walker, Inc. v. A & S Tropical, Inc., 407 F.2d 4, 
9 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969). 
38. 419 U.S. 186 (1974). 
39. The Ninth Circuit had stated: 
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agreed that at  least one of the transactions which resulted in 
discrimination must actually "cross a state line."40 
D. Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
The original section 7 of the Clayton Actd1 was intended to 
"prohibit and make unlawful certain trade practices which . . . 
are not covered by . . . existing antitrust acts and . . . to arrest 
the creation of trusts, conspiracies, and monopolies in their inci- 
piency and before c o n s ~ m m a t i o n . " ~ ~  The stimulants for 
enactment were a widespread belief that the Sherman Act had 
been weakened by the Courtd3 in Standard Oil v. United Statesd4 
and United States v. American Tobacco C O . ~ ~  and the rising fear 
of increasing acquisitions and  consolidation^.^^ "Commerce," as 
defined in the original Clayton was considered to be at  least 
equal to the scope of "commerce" under the Sherman 
We see no reason why sales which are "in commerce" because of their nexus 
with an instrumentality of interstate commerce must also satisfy a state-line 
test of "in commerce." To be sure, the statutory language of the Clayton and 
Robinson-Patman Acts is not as broad and flexible as that of the Sherman Act. 
Nevertheless, the fact that these acts were intended to supplement the purpose 
and effect of the Sherman Act supports a uniform interpretation of the "in 
commerce" requirement present in all three acts. 
In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 202, 206 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Gulf 
Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974). 
40. 419 U.S. a t  200 (quoting Hiram Walker, Inc. v. A & S Tropical, Inc., 407 F.2d 4, 
9 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969)). 
41. The original section 7 provided in pertinent part: 
That  no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or 
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another 
corporation engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may 
be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is 
so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such 
commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly in any line 
of commerce. 
Clayton Act 6 7, ch. 323, 5 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. J$ 18 (1970). 
42. S. REP. NO. 698,63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914). Section 7 was intended to eliminate 
the aggregation of economic power by stock purchase "so far as it is possible to do so." 
H.R. REP. NO. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1914). 
43. Levy, The Clayton Act-An Imperfect Supplement to the Sherman Law, 3 VA. 
L. REV. 411, 414-17 (1916). 
44. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
45. 221 U.S. 106 (1911). 
46. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). 
A total of 3,238 acquisitions and consolidations were recorded between 1895 and 1905. 
NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN I DUSTRY, 1895-1956 (1959) (quoted in S. OP- 
PENHEIM & G. WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 318 (3d ed. 1968)). 
47. " 'Commerce', as used herein, means trade or commerce among the several States 
and with foreign nations . . . ." 15 U.S.C. J$ 12 (1970). 
48. See H.R. REP. NO. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 7 (1914). 
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In 1950, section 7 of the Clayton Act was amended to reach 
acquisitions that had not previously been covered by the Act.'" 
The amendment, however, continued to employ the original 
"engaged in commerce" jurisdictional testesO Prior to 1950, efforts 
had been made to broaden the jurisdictional test,51 but these 
efforts were unsuccessful. In 1958, hearings were held on two 
bilW2 that would have broadened the "engaged in commerce" 
requirement of section 7 by making it applicable when "either the 
acquiring corporation" or the acquired corporation "is engaged in 
commerce."53 Neither bill was enacted. 
49. For a review of the legislative history of the amendment see MARTIN 221-53; Bok, 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 
226, 233-38 (1960); Handler & Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Celler- 
Kefauver Antimerger Act, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 652-74 (1961); Note, Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act; A Legislative History, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 766 (1952); Comment, The Amend- 
ment to Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 46 Nw. U.L. REV. 444 (1951). 
There were three principal reasons for the amendment. (1) The Court had construed 
the statute to apply only to acquisitions by stock purchase and had exempted asset 
acquisitions. Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934); FTC v. 
Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926). (2) It was assumed that 6 7 did not apply to 
vertical mergers. H.R. REP. NO. 1191,81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949). (3) Some feared that 
the use of the Sherman Act test in 6 7 cases would result in the proscription of small 
business mergers. S. REP. NO. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950). 
50. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), amending ch. 323, 4 7, 38 Stat. 731, 732 (1914). Section 7 
provides in pertinent part: 
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, 
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the 
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, 
where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such 
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a 
monopoly. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
51. One such effort can be found in H.R. 2357, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), which 
reads, in part, as follows: 
Whenever the consummation of any plan, undertaking or agreement by or 
on behalf of any corporation engaged in or affecting commerce or engaged in 
manufacturing or processing for distribution in commerce or by or on behalf of 
any of its subsidiaries so engaged, to acquire the whole or any part of the stock 
or other share capital or the whole or any part of the assets other than invento- 
ries of any other corporation likewise engaged would involve property to the 
value of more than $ . . . . . . ., no such plan, undertaking, or agreement by 
or on behalf of any corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade 
Commission under sections 7 or 11 of the Clayton Act, as amended, shall be 
consummated, effectuated, and completed except upon and after compliance 
with the following requirements: . . . . 
Another such effort can be found in H.R. 1240, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). 
These bills directly resulted from the Temporary National Economic Committee 
report suggesting premerger review by the FTC. Note, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A 
Legislative History, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 766 n.3 (1945). 
52. S. 198, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); S. 722, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). 
53. Hearings on S. 198, S. 721, S. 722, and S. 349 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust 
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The reach of section 7 has been subject to varying interpreta- 
tions by judicial and administrative tribunals. In Transamerica 
Corp. v. Board of  Governors, 54 the Third Circuit concluded that 
"[wle find nothing in the legislative history . . . to indicate that 
Congress did not intend by Section 7 to exercise its power under 
the commerce clause of the Constitution to the fullest extent."55 
The Federal Trade Commission has taken a narrower view. In 
Foremost Dairies, Inc. ,56 the Commissioner held that a dairy that 
sold all of its products intrastate was not "engaged in commerce" 
although it had purchased items shipped interstate to a whole- 
saler's warehouse ?' 
The Supreme Court had never directly interpreted the "en- 
gaged in commerce" reach of section 7 prior to deciding the in- 
stant case, although there were intimations in Gulf Oil Corp. v. 
Copp Paving Co. that the Court would narrowly construe it? 
Interestingly, the suggestion in Gulf of a narrow construction was 
ignored by the courts in subsequent  decision^.^^ For example, 
after quoting extensively from the Gulf opinion, a federal district 
court in Gasperi v. Cinemette Corp. of Americaa0 concluded that 
"[tlhe Supreme Court has thus declared as possibly coming 
within the protection of the Clayton Act not only activities 'in 
commerce' but also activities having a substantial effect on com- 
merce 
In holding that the "engaged in commerce" language of sec- 
tion 7 does not encompass intrastate activities that substantially 
affect interstate commerce, the Court relied on the narrow con- 
struction given section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act in 
and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 518 (1958). 
54. 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953). 
55. Id. at 166 (dictum). 
56. 60 F.T.C. 944 (1962). 
57. Id. at 1090. 
58. 419 U.S. 186, 202 (1974). 
This argument [expanding the Clayton Act coexistent with the commerce 
clause power] from the history and practical purposes of the Clayton Act is 
neither without force nor a t  least a measure of support. But whether i t  would 
justify radical expansion of the Clayton Act's scope beyond that which the 
statutory language defines-expansion, moreover, by judicial decision rather 
than amendatory legislation-is doubtful. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
59. See Gasperi v. Cinemette Corp. of America, 391 F. Supp..826, 830 (W.D. Pa. 
1975); United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 1975-1 Trade Cas. fT 66,233,Y 66,238 (D. Colo. 1975). 
60. 391 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. Pa. 1975). 
61. Id. at 830. 
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Bunte  brother^.^^ Since both statutes have "in commerce" re- 
quirements, were enacted by the 63d Congress, and were designed 
to protect competition, the Court concluded that both should be 
similarly c o n ~ t r u e d . ~ ~  I t  reasoned that the broader construction 
would "give a federal agency pervasive control over myriads of 
local businesses in matters heretofore traditionally left to local 
custom or local law."64 
The government argued that the legislative history and pur- 
pose of the Clayton Act indicated that its reach should be coex- 
tensive with the commerce clause power. In rejecting that view, 
the Court distinguished the language of the Sherman Act from 
that of the Clayton Act. The Court reasoned that the prohibitions 
against any "restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States"65 in the Sherman Act directly concerned impacts on inter- 
state commerce and that therefore the Act reaches intrastate ac- 
tivities having a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The 
precise "in commerce" language of section 7, on the other hand, 
was interpreted by the Court to require that the activities ac- 
tually be in interstate commerce.66 But more importantly, the 
Court concluded that the reenactment of section 7 in 1950 with 
the same "in commerce" test was an expression of congressional 
approval of the more limited reach. Since Congress must have 
been aware of the Bunte Brothers decision, the retention of the 
original language was an indication that Congress did not intend 
to exercise its full power under the commerce clause.67 The Court 
focused on the apparent lack of express legislative intent to 
broaden the jurisdictional reach68 but failed or refused to consider 
the broad purpose behind the original enactment of the entire 
section. 
Mr. Justice Douglas, joined in his dissent by Mr. Justice 
Brennan, argued that  there was no evidence to indicate that 
Congress intended to limit the jurisdictional reach of the Clayton 
Act to something less than that of the Sherman Act? He incorpo- 
62. United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 276-77 
(1975). 
63. Id. at 277. 
64. Id. at 276-77 (quoting FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 354-55 (1941)). 
65. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (Supp. I, 1975). 
66. 422 U.S. at 278. 
67. Id. at 277-83. 
68. The Court's response to the absence of express congressional action to broaden $ 
7 is probably best represented in the opinion by the language quoted from Bunte Bros. 
that "[aln inroad upon local conditions and local standards of such far-reaching import 
as is involved here, ought to await a clearer mandate from Congress." Id. at 276-77 
(emphasis added). 
69. Id. at 287. 
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rated his dissenting arguments in Gulf by referencee70 There he 
had argued that the Clayton Act definition of commerce, "trade 
or commerce among the several states,"71 had been held by the 
Court to embrace "all commerce save that 'which is confined to 
a single State and does not affect other States.' "72 Mr. Justice 
Blackmun argued in his separate dissenting opinion that the pur- 
pose of the Clayton Act was to supplement the Sherman Act and 
that therefore section 7 should similarly be considered an exercise 
of the full commerce clause power by C~ngress.'~ Both dissenting 
opinions focused on the broader purpose underlying section 7. 
Both concluded that the jurisdictional reach of section 7 should 
be identical to that of the Sherman 
A. The  Purpose Underlying Section 7 of the Clayton Act  
By focusing on the broad purpose underlying the original 
enactment, the Court could have justified a broad interpretation 
of the jurisdistional reach of section 7. Since section 7 was de- 
signed to supplement the Sherman Act and arrest potential Sher- 
man Act violations "in their incipiency and before consumma- 
tied"" and since "the objective was to prevent accretions of power 
which 'are individually so minute as to make it difficult to use 
the Sherman Act test against them,' "'"t could be argued that 
the reach of section 7 should parallel that of the Sherman Act. 
"A fundamental purpose of amending 5 7 was to arrest the trend 
toward concentration, the tendency to monopoly, before the con- 
sumer's alternatives disappeared through merger . . . ."" Argua- 
70. Id. at  286. 
71. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970). 
72. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U S .  186, 205-06 (1974) (dissenting opin- 
ion) (quoting Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1912)). 
73. 422 US.  a t  287. 
74. Id. a t  287. 
75. S. REP. NO. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914). 
76. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U S .  271, 280 (1964) (quoting S. 
REP. NO. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950). 
77. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U S .  321, 367 (1963). For further 
indications of the spirit in which the courts have interpreted congressional intent in the 
enactment of 4 7, see United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U S .  270, 275 (1966) 
("Congress, viewing mergers as a continuous, pervasive threat to small business, passed 
$ 7 of the Clayton Act . . . ."); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U S .  
271, 281 (1964) ("Rome [company being acquired by Alcoa] seems to us the prototype 
of the small independent that Congress aimed to preserve by § 7."); United States v. 
Continental Can Co., 378 U S .  441, 461 (1964) ("The case falls squarely within the princi- 
ple that where there has been a 'history of tendency toward concentration in the industry' 
tendencies toward further concentration 'are to be curbed in their incipiency.' "); United 
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bly, congressional intent can best be effectuated by extending 
section 7 to reach acquisitions of intrastate corporations where 
there is a substantial effect on interstate commerce.78 
The reliance of the Court on the narrow construction i t  had 
earlier given section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 
appears ill-founded. Congress, by broadening the reach of section 
5 recently, clearly indicated that the narrow construction given 
section 5 in Bunte Brothers was not in harmony with congres- 
sional intent.79 Section 5, like the Sherman Act, now makes full 
use of congressional power under the commerce clause. 
The Court's reliance on the restricted reading of section 2(a) 
of the Robinson-Patman Act in Gulf also seems inapposite. The 
policy of the Robinson-Patman Act of preventing price discrimi- 
nation has actually been considered a t  variance with other anti- 
trust statutes aimed a t  promoting c o m p e t i t i ~ n . ~ ~  Further, the 
general "engaged in commerce" requirement of the Robinson- 
Patman Act is unnecessary in defining that Act's jurisdictional 
scope because one of the allegedly discriminating sales must 
"cross a state line?' It could be contended, therefore, that sec- 
tion 7 of the Clayton Act, rather than being construed narrowly 
as is section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, an arguably dis- 
similar statute, should be construed as broadly as the Sherman 
States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 170 (1964) ("[Wle are but expounding a 
national policy enunciated by the Congress to preserve and promote a free competitive 
economy."); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 346 (1962) ("We cannot 
avoid the mandate of Congress that tendencies toward concentration in industry are to 
be curbed in their incipiency, particularly when those tendencies are being accelerated 
through giant steps striding across a hundred cities a t  a time."). 
78. Further support for extending the reach of Q 7 can be found by examining the 
congressional intent underlying the other antitrust statutes. This canon bf statutory-con- 
struction is designated statutes in pari materia. See C. SANDS, STATUTES & STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION Q 51.02 (4th ed. 1973). 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in FTC u. Motion Picture Advertising Seru. Co., 
wrote: 
I am not unaware that the policies directed at maintaining effective compe- 
tition, as expressed in the Sherman Law, the Clayton Act, as amended by the 
Robinson-Patman Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act, are difficult to 
formulate . . . . It is also incumbent upon us to seek to rationalize the four 
statutes directed toward a common end and make of them, to the extent that 
what Congress has written permits, a harmonious body of law. 
344 U.S. 392, 405-06 (1953). 
79. See note 30 supra. 
80. Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 
1327-50 (IT h8); Burns, The Anti-trust Laws and the Regulation of Price Competition, 4 
LAW AND CONTEMP. ROB. 301 (1937). But see Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 US. 231, 249 
(1951). 
81. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974). 
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Act and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act? 
There are intimations in the opinion that the Court felt the 
narrow construction of section 7 was necessary to protect small 
business by eliminating actions against de minimus mergers.83 
But section 7 is by its language limited to those acquisitions in 
any section of the country that have the potential to lessen com- 
petition or to create a m o n ~ p o l y . ~  Since small business mergers 
would not be able to generate the required "substantial" anti- 
competitive effect, there is no need to protect them a t  the thresh- 
old jurisdictional stage." On the other hand, a narrow construc- 
tion of section 7, as is given in the instant case, may very well 
operate to injure small businesses by permitting accretions of 
monopolistic or anticompetitive power.86 
Under the rule of the instant case, there can be no violation 
of section 7 as long as the acquired corporation is engaged solely 
in intrastate commerce. Perhaps the strongest argument in favor 
of extending the reach of section 7 is to close this loophole. Ameri- 
can, for example, made 54 acquisitions between 1961 and 1973, 
including five janitorial service companies in the Los Angeles 
area?' American has also indicated an intention to accelerate this 
acquisition program.88 This is precisely the type of gradual 
monopolization of an industry that section 7 was enacted to pre- 
vent. But as long as these future acquisitions are of intrastate 
corporations, American will not be within the reach of section 7 
as construed by the Court in the instant case.89 Congress must 
now consider amending section 7 as i t  did section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act. 
82. Generally, the reach of statutes enacted under the commerce clause has been 
found to be coextensive with full congressional power. Note, Portrait of the Sherman Act 
as a Commerce Clause Statute, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 323, 324-25 (1974). 
83. 422 U.S. a t  276-77 (1975). 
84. 15 U.S.C. $ 18 (1970) ("where . . . the effect of such acquisition may be substan- 
tially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."). 
85. There was concern a t  the time of the amendment of $ 7 in 1950 that the reading 
of the Sherman Act test into § 7 was preventing mergers by small businesses. This was 
partly remedied by the deletion from the original § 7 of the word community as well as 
the wording requiring the corporations to be in competition. The purpose was to proscribe 
only those mergers which would potentially have a significant impact. S. REP. NO. 1775, 
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 7 (1950); H.R. REP. NO. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6-8 (1949). 
86. See generally United'States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274-75 (1966); 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 281 (1964). 
87. Brief for Appellant a t  4-5. 
88. Id. a t  5. 
89. If an intrastate corporation such as Benton, however, were to purchase American, 
that acquisition would be within reach under the second paragraph of 9 7 which provides 
in pertinent part that "[nlo corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole 
or any part of the stock or other share capital . . . of one or more corporations engaged in 
commerce . . . ." 15 U.S.C. $ 18 (1970). 
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B. Statutory Construction and Judicial Restraint 
The major difficulty with using the preceding arguments to 
support a broad interpretation of the reach of section 7 is that it 
substitutes an interpretation of congressional intent for the ex- 
press language of the statute?O The broad interpretation would 
require the Court to read "engaged in commerce" as "engaged in 
or affecting commerce." There is no clear support in the legisla- 
tive history for this broader reading? The best argument for ex- 
pansion that can be made is that Congress intended with the 
Clayton Act to supplement the Sherman Act, and therefore sec- 
tion 7, like the Sherman Act, should be considered a full exercise 
of congressional power under the commerce clause.92 Had this 
been its intent in enacting section 7, however, Congress could 
have readily manifested it by duplicating the exact wording of the 
commerce provision of the Sherman Act and expressly extending 
the reach of the statute to corporations that in any way restrained 
"trade or commerce among the several States." Instead, Congress 
chose to limit the supplememtary legislation to those corpora- 
tions "engaged in commerce." No consideration was given to 
broadening the jurisdictional reach of section 7 a t  the time of the 
1950 amendment.93 Further, in 1958, bills introduced in Congress 
to extend the reach of section 7 were defeated.94 With such an 
unclear legislative history, the canons of statutory construction 
generally applied by the Supreme Court support the narrower 
interpretation given section 7 in the instant case.95 As Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter once wrote, "[aln omission at  the time of enact- 
ment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially sup- 
plied however much later wisdom may recommend the inclu- 
sion ."96 
Also, extending the reach of section 7 may constitute a 
judicial usurpation of the legislative function of Congress. The 
90. For this same argument in the context of § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act see 
86 HARV. L. REV. 765, 769 (1973). 
91. Cf.  Handler, Quantitative Substantiality and the Celler-Kefauver Act-A Look 
at the Record, 7 MERCER L. REV. 279, 287 (1956) ("The best that can be said about this 
legislative history is that it is obscure, ambiguous and inconclusive."). 
92. This view was taken by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Transamerica Corp. 
v.  Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 166 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S .  901 (1953) 
(dictum). 
93. See notes 49 & 50 and accompanying text supra. 
94. See notes 53 & 54 and accompanying text supra. 
95. See generally 86 HARV. L. REV. 765, 772 & n.36 (1973) (citing Frankfurter, Some 
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1947) [hereinafter cited 
as Reflections]). 
96. Reflections 534. 
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proper function of the Court in the instant case was to determine 
whether American and the Benton corporations were within the 
reach of the statute as written by Congress and not whether they 
were within the reach of the statute as it should have been writ- 
ten?' Granted, the statute as interpreted by the Court does not 
reach acquisitions of intrastate corporations even where the activ- 
ities of those corporations affect interstate commerce. A strong 
argument can be made that this loophole diminishes the procom- 
petitive and antimonopolistic force of the Clayton Act and should 
be closed. However, this argument assumes that industrial con- 
centration is increasing and that acquisitions of intrastate corpo- 
rations by interstate corporations contribute significantly to that 
concentration. On these subjects, economists are in substantial 
d i~agreement .~~ Congress, not the courts, is better equipped to 
properly resolve this complex factual disagreement and deter- 
mine the proper reach of section 7? 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A strong argument exists for the broader reading of sec- 
tion 7. But the argument should be made to Congress. The Su- 
preme Court, in refusing to adopt a broad reading of section 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act in Bunte Brothers, argued 
that the express language of the statute should be adhered to 
unless the purpose of the act would thereby be defeated.loO Such 
an argument applies with full force in the instant case. Congress 
did not clearly manifest an intention to use its full power under 
the commerce clause when it enacted and amended section 7. The 
Court correctly limited the reach of section 7 to the explicit lan- 
guage of the statute. 
97. The role of the Supreme Court in reviewing legislation is beyond the scope of this 
case note. Suffice it to say that even the most activist of judges agrees that the role of the 
Court is to interpret the law and not to make policy choices for society. See generally 
Christie, A Model of Judicial Review of Legislation, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1306, 1342-46 
(1975). 
98. For a compilation of the varying views, see S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST LAWS 317-22 (3d ed. 1968). 
99. The contrary conclusion is not compelled by the argument that Congress has 
already resolved the question with its amendment of Q 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act. Section 5 is concerned only with deceptive acts and practices by manufacturers. It 
would be assuming too much to conclude that Congress, with its extension of 4 5, passed 
judgment on the advisability or wisdom of permitting interstate corporations to acquire 
intrastate businesses free from scrutiny under § 7 of the Clayton Act. 
100. 312 U.S. 349, 350-52 (1941). 
